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A b str a c t. We present an algorithm for generating a random weak order of 
to objects in which all possible weak orders are equally likely. The form of 
the algorithm suggests analytic expressions for the probability of a Condorcet 
winner both for linear and for weak preference orders.
1. Introduction
A classical problem in the theory of social choice is the determination of the probability 
of the occurrence of a Condorcet winner in an election. Consider a committee of n 
members to  be called voters, faced with the choice between to alternatives. Suppose 
th a t each voter expresses an order of preference for these alternatives. Such a set of n 
preference orders is called a profile. An alternative c is said to  be the Condorcet winner 
or, simply, winner of this profile if for every other alternative a the number of voters 
who prefer c to  a is strictly larger than the number of voters who prefer a to  c. Clearly, 
the occurrence of such a winner is a desirable situation in this form of group decision 
making. However, as is well known, a Condorcet winner need not exist; not even if 
the committee has an odd number of members, each having pronounced preferences. 
This regrettable fact is known as the no-winner form of Condorcet’s paradox [Gehrlein 
1983, p. 162] after the Marquis de Condorcet [1785, 1789] who is generally credited 
with its discovery [Riker, 1961, p. 901; Black, 1971, Chapter 18; Young, 1988; Van 
Deemen, 1997, Chapter 3]. See Riker [1961, p. 901] and Gehrlein [1983, p. 163] for 
references on the history and (re)discoveries of the paradox.
The problem to be addressed here is: determine the probability P ( n ,m ) (and, like­
wise, P * (n ,m )) for the occurrence of a Condorcet winner if the voters choose their 
preference orders independently and uniformly from the set of all possible linear (or 
weak) orders of the alternatives. Here, a weak order is a linear order on a partition 
of the alternatives into non-empty blocks, where the alternatives inside a single block 
are considered equally eligible by the voter who expresses the weak order in question.
Except for Jones, Radcliff, Taber and Timpone [1995] who study P  as well as P*, 
previous studies of these probabilities only consider P. Examples are: Garman & 
Kamien, 1968; Niemi & Weisberg, 1968; DeMeyer & Plott, 1970; May, 1971; Gehrlein 
&Fishburn, 1976; Gehrlein, 1983. All of these studies consider profiles of (random) 
linear orders th a t result from independent sampling without replacement of the to 
alternatives. Here we choose to  assign independent random scores to  the alternatives, 
and take the orders induced by these scores as (random) linear or weak orders of 
preference.
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A profile can have only one Condorcet winner as here defined. There are two rules in 
the literature for designating an alternative c as to  be majority preferred to  an alterna­
tive a. Let N  (ac) denote the number of voters who prefer a to  c. For c to  be majority- 
preferred to  a, the majority rule (e.g., Sen [1970, p. 23]) requires N (ca ) >  N (ac ) 
whereas the simple majority rule (e.g., Fishburn [1973, p. 18]) requires this inequality 
to  be strict. If n  is even, applying the majority rule to  all pairs of alternatives does 
not necessarily yield a unique Condorcet winner (provided there exists one) since it 
may happen th a t N (ac) =  N (ca ) for some pairs {a,c}. Accordingly, studies on P  
and P *, such as the ones just mentioned, only consider profiles with n  odd. As our 
approach holds for odd and even n  alike, we will use the simple majority rule. So, in 
contrast to, e.g., Kelly [1987, p. 15] and Van Deemen [1999, p. 172], we do not allow 
non-unique winners.
By simulating a million elections on a computer for various pairs (n , m ), Jones et 
al. [1995] obtained a table of estimates of P ( n ,m ) and P * (n ,m ) which to  our knowl­
edge is the largest made so far. In their simulations they sampled linear orders by the 
algorithm of selection without replacement among the to alternatives. For the purpose 
of sampling weak orders of the to alternatives they drew up a list of all possible weak 
orders, and then chose elements from this list a t random. Now, the number of weak or­
ders on to objects behaves asymptotically as TO¡/2(log2)TO+1. (See [J.P. Barthélémy, 
1980; Bailey, 1998]. The factor log2 is the radius of convergence of the generating 
function F(z) = (2 — ez)_1 in (3).) Due to  this fast increase as a function of to, the 
above listing procedure is only feasible for to up to  about 15.
In this paper we present an algorithm for sampling weak orders on to alternatives 
which works for arbitrarily high values of to, and yields all possible weak orders with 
equal probabilities. It runs as follows. First we choose a ‘maximum score’ K  according 
to  a certain well-chosen probability distribution nm on the natural numbers. Then we 
choose for every alternative independently a score from 1 to  i f  according to  the uniform 
distribution. The sample order is then the weak order of these scores.
An attractive feature of this algorithm is th a t the alternatives obtain independent 
scores. In fact, also for linear orders there exists an algorithm with this property: 
instead of selecting alternatives without replacement, we can allot to  each of them 
independently a random score, uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1], and then 
take the (linear) order of these real-valued scores as our sample order. Generating 
preference orders by independent scores greatly facilitates the analysis of P  and P*.
A further simplification of the calculation of P  and P* results from the observation 
th a t the probability for the occurrence of a Condorcet winner equals to times the 
probability th a t a particular alternative wins. We choose one ‘pivot’ alternative once 
and for all, and let the other to — 1 alternatives compete with it independently. This 
approach enables us to  give expressions for P ( n ,m ) and P * (n ,m ) in which to plays a 
fairly simple role, so th a t the study of asymptotic behavior for large to comes within 
reach.
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2. The number of weak orders
Let R  be a binary relation on a finite set A. We recall that R  is called connected 
if for all a,b £ A we have either aRb or bRa, transitive if aRb and bRc imply aRc, 
and antisymmetric if aRb and bRa imply that a = b. A weak order on A is a binary 
relation on A that is both connected and transitive. A linear order is a weak order 
which is antisymmetric [Krantz, Luce, Suppes & Tversky, 1971, p. 14; Roberts 1979, 
p. 15; Micheli, 1990, p. 167].
Interpreting A as comprising to alternatives, we let W  be a weak order on A, and let 
~  denote the binary relation on A defined by
a ~  b iff aWb and bWa .
In the case of a voter’s preference order we interpret a ~  b as meaning that the voter 
is indifferent with respect to a and b. Let 5 : = { 6 e . 4 | f e ~ a }  denote the indifference 
class of a, and A / ~  the set of indifference classes that W  induces on A. Let k denote 
the cardinality of A /~ .  Clearly ! < / , - <  in. The binary relation L on A / ~  given by 
aLb iff aWb, is a linear order [Roberts 1979, p. 31, Theorem 1.2.; Krantz et. al. 1971, 
p. 16]. Conversely every linear order on a partition of A into k nonempty subsets 
determines a unique weak order on A with #(.A /~) =  k. Therefore, the number 
w(m,k)  of such weak orders is given by
k
w(m, k) = kl S(m, k) := ^ (  —1)* ( . ) (k -  i)m ,
*=o
where S(m ,k),  a Stirling number of the second kind, gives the number of partitions 
of a set of to elements into k nonempty subsets [Comtet, 1974, p.204; Van Lint and 
Wilson, 1993, p. 71, 105-6]. The total number Wm of weak orders on to objects is 
thus given by
m
Wm =  w(rn, 1) + -----b tu (to, to) =  ^  kl S(rn, k) . (1)
k= 1
The quickest way to find Wm is by use of the recursion
w(m, k) = k(w(m  — 1 , k) + w(m  — 1 , k — 1 )) , (2 )
which follows from the corresponding recursion for the Stirling numbers [Van Lint 
and Wilson, 1993, p. 105]. Equation (2) can be understood directly as follows. A 
weak order on {1 , . . . , t o}  into k blocks can be obtained either by weakly ordering 
{1 , . . . ,  to — 1 } into k blocks, and then adding to to one of the k blocks, or by weakly- 
ordering {1 , . . . ,  to — 1 } into k — 1 blocks, and inserting the block {to} in one of k 
ways. The calculation of w(m,k)  and, from these, Wm is illustrated in Table 1.
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Table 1
w(m,k)  and Wm
TO 4- k  —¥
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 w m
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 3
3 1 6 6 0 0 0 0 13
4 1 14 36 24 0 0 0 75
5 1 30 150 240 1 2 0 0 0 541
6 1 62 540 1560 1800 720 0 4683
7 1 126 1806 8400 16800 15120 5040 47293
For the sequel a second expression for Wm is relevant.
T h e o r e m  1. For all to € N,
w V  k ' "vym~ 2_^  2k+1 ' 
k= 0
Proof. Define for k € N and z € C sufficiently small,
°°' giri
Fk{z) := V  w (m ,k )—  .ml
m = 0
Then by (2) we have for k > 1:
°°' 1 °°^
K ( z) = 'Y '  w(m,k)~------ — = w(m + l , k )—rfcW ^  v ' ( t o - 1)! ^  to!
m = l  m = 0
°°^
= ^ 2  k(w(m,k) + w(m,k  -  1))—- = k(Fk(z) +  Ffc_i(z)) .
™=o m-
The unique solution of this system of differential equations with boundary conditions 
F0(z) = 1 for all z and Fk(0) =  1 for all k is
Fk(z) = (ez ^ l ) k .
Now put
00
F «  := E  ■ <3>
m = 0
4
Then, because of (1) and noting that w(m,k) = 0 for k > m,
OO
F(z) = Y,Fk(z)
k= 0
1 — (ez — 1 ) 2 ^ e z
1 1
The result follows from comparison with (3). We note that the power series for F(z) 
has positive coefficients, and radius of convergence log 2 , so that on [0 , log 2 ) the above
3. G enerating random  weak orders
From Theorem 1 it follows that the sequence 7tto(1 ), 7tto(2 ), 7tto(3 ), . . .  of positive num­
bers given by
sums up to 1 , and hence defines a probability distribution on the natural numbers. 
This distribution plays a crucial role in our algorithm. First we need a lemma.
L em m a 2. Let I 6  N. Then
Proof. In an infinite sequence of tosses with a fair coin the probability that head comes 
up for the (I +  l)-th time in the (k + l)-th toss is
The lemma expresses the fact that the (1+ l)-th head is certain to come up eventually.
□
T heorem  3. Let A be a set of m  elements, rn > 1. Let a stochastic weak order R  
on A be generated by the following algorithm:
(i) Draw an integer-valued random variable K  according to the probability distribu­
tion 7Tm . (See the instruction below).
(ii) To each a £ A assign a random score X a according to the uniform distribution on
interchange of summations is justified. □
7Fro(fc) Wm ' 2*!+ 1 (4)
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(iii) Put aRb iff X a < Xj,.
Then all of the Wm possible weak orders on A are obtained with the same probability 
1 ¡ W m .
Proof. Consider a fixed weak order R  on A. As indicated in Section 2, R  is completely 
determined by a number I > 1 and a partition of A into I nonempty disjoint blocks, 
Bi, B2, ■ ■ ■, Bi, by the prescription:
aRb iff a £ B t and b £ Bj with i < j  .
Therefore the score assignment X  : A {1,2, . . . ,  K } : a X a induces the weak 
order R  in step (iii) iff X  takes a constant value on each block B t of R  which is a strictly- 
increasing function of i. Now, any strictly increasing function {1, . . . ,  1} {1, . . . ,  K }  
is completely determined by its range, so for fixed K  there are (^) functions which 
induce the weak order R  on A. (We take ( f )  to be 0 if K  < I.)
Since the number of possible assignments X  : A {1,2, . . . ,  K }  is K m, it follows that 
a fixed weak order R  having I blocks is produced by the algorithm with the following 
probability
OO
is produced] =  [K = k] ■ P[i? is produced|if =  k] 
k=l
_  v 2'  /  1 k m \  (  1
-  2^  I w . . .  '
k=l m 2*+*; \ k
_  1 y ,  1 /jfc\ _  1
where in the  last equality sign Lem m a 2 is used. □
Remark.  The above reasoning yields an independent proof of Theorem  1: F irs t define 
W m as the  infinite sum in Theorem  1, and then  use the  proof of Theorem  3 to  show 
th a t
V —  =  1 .
r w ™
I t then  follows th a t  W m is the  num ber of weak orders of A.
Instruction.  In order to  draw  repeatedly a  random  variable K  w ith d istribution n m , 
as required in step (i), one may proceed as follows.
1. Before the  s ta r t of the  simulations:
(la .)  C alculate W m using the  recursion (2).
(lb .)  Choose a  small num ber Ö such th a t  l / ö  is of the  order of the  to ta l num ber of 
weak orders to  be generated, and find N  £ N so large th a t
JL km 
w -  -  E  5Í+T < s ■
k=1
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(lc.) Fill an array with the partial sums So, Si, S2 , ■ ■ ■, Sn  given by
k j m
S i :  ' k  =  0 , l , . . . , N - l - ,  S N : = W m .
j = 0
2. For each of the weak orders to be sampled:
(2a.) Let Y  := Wm ■ RND(l), where RND(l) produces a random number uniformly 
over [0 ,1].
(2b.) Let K  be the least integer for which S k  > Y .
Then for all f c € { l , . . . , W - l } :
I 1 I. TO
P[K = k} = PfSfc.! < Y  < Sk] = — (Sk -  Sk- i )  = — ¥ T I  = nm(k) .
With probability less than Ö the random variable K  takes the value N  where actually 
it should take a larger value.
4. Probabilities o f Condorcet w inners from profiles 
produced by independent scores
As a spin-off from the algorithm in Section 3 we are enriched with a general idea. 
Apparently we can generate random weak orders from independent random scores 
( X a) aeA with identical discrete probability distributions. Obviously we can also gen­
erate linear orders in this way if only we take the probability distribution of the scores 
continuous, thus excluding indifference.
P r o p o s it io n  4. Let A be a fìnite set of m  elements, rn > 1. Let a stochastic order 
R on A be generated by the following algorithm:
(i) To each a £ A assign a random score X a according to the uniform distribution on 
[0 , 1].
(ii) Put aRb iff X a < Xf,.
Then with probability 1 the order R  is a linear order and each of the ml possible 
linear orders on A occurs with equal probability 1/ml.
This idea can be used to simulate elections. However, computer simulations to es­
timate probabilities are typically run for want of an analytic expression. So, let us 
first see what can be done analytically with this insight. We are interested in profiles 
(Ri,R2 ,- ■ ■, Rn) of linear or weak orders on the set A of alternatives. We say that 
a € A is majority preferred to b G A (and we write aMb) if
# {  j  < n I aRjb } < # {  j  < n \ bRja } .
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(Note that aRjb stands for ‘voter j  prefers b to a ’.) An alternative c € A is called the 
Condorcet winner of the profile (R i ,R 2 , ■ ■ ■, R n) if
VaeA\{c} ■ cMa  . (5)
It was observed by Niemi and Weisberg [1968, p. 321] that, since there can be at most 
one winner, and the alternatives all have equal probabilities to win, the probability for 
a majority winner to occur equals m  times the probability that any given alternative 
wins. So let us pick out a pivot alternative c € A and consider the probability that 
(5) is the case. The different events [cMa] and [cMb] with a ^  b are in general 
statistically dependent. Indeed, taking for example n = 1, A = {a,b,c}, and linear 
preference orders, we find that
W[cMa] = W[cMb\ = \  ,
whereas
P[cMa and cMb] = |  ^  |  x \  .
Of course this statistical dependence greatly complicates the calculation of the prob­
ability for (5) to occur. However, when independent scores are used to generate the 
profile, the events [cMa] and [cMb] for different a, b and c become independent when 
conditioned on the scores X*, X^, ■ ■ ■, X ” of the pivot (and, in the weak case, also on 
the maximum scores K\, K 2,..., K n).
So, considering linear orders, for any ( x i ,x 2 , • • • , x n) € [0 , 1]” let P(æ1 ,œ2,---,æ„)(JE?) 
denote the probability of an event E  conditioned on X \  =  x i , . . . ,  X ” = x n. Then,
f [VoG/1\{c} : cMa\ = [  ■ ■ ■ [  P(xi,x2,...,xn) [VaGj4\ {c} : cMa]dx!dx2 ■ ■ ■ dxn ,
Jo Jo
nl / \ ra—1
■ J  Í P(Xl,x2,•••,*„) [cM a]J d x 1d x 2 -- -d x
where a is an arbitrary alternative different from c. So we only have to calculate the 
probability P(Xl,X2 ,--.,x„)[cMa] for some a ^  c. However, since the preference orders 
Ri, R2 , ■ ■ ■, Rn are independent, this latter probability is equal to
n 5
E “(i).
^6{1.-1>" 3 = 1
E i “W)>0
where [cRja] denotes the event that voter j  prefers c to a, and [cRj^a] the event that 
voter j  prefers a to c, and the sum is over all sequences w of l ’s and — l ’s whose sum 
^  • uj(j) is positive, meaning that there are more voters who prefer c to a (these are 
indicated by the l ’s in u) than there are who prefer a to c (indicated by the —l ’s). 
Now, given that X | =  Xj for j  = 1 , . . . ,  n, the probability that voter j  prefers c to a 
is P[X | < Xj] = Xj, while the probability that he prefers a to c is 1 — Xj.
Collecting results we conclude:
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T heorem  5. The probability P(n, to) for the ocurrence of a Condorcet winner when 
n voters express linear preference orders on m alternatives is given by
1 f 1■■■ S n (x i , X 2 , - ■ ■ , x n)m 1d x i d x 2 ■ ■ ■ d x n ,
Jo
where n
S n ( x i , x 2, - " , x „ )  := E  ü  
^6{l.-l>" j = 1 
E i “U)>0
and
f i ( x )  := x  and f - i ( x )  := 1 — x  .
In an analogous way we obtain the  corresponding theorem  for weak orderings.
T heorem  6 . The probability P* (n, to) for the ocurrence of a Condorcet winner when 
n voters express weak preference orders with respect to m  alternatives is given by
oo oo -----\-kn+n ki kn
=  i S r  H  H  ( 2 ) £  " '  £  S*{k1, - - - , k n-,x1, - - - , x n)m~ 1
m k!=1 k„=1 ' ' Xl=l x„=l
where n
S l ( k 1, k 2, - - - , k n ; x 1, x 2 , - - - , x „ )  := E  Y[9u,{ j) (kj ,Xj )  ,
w ei-i.o .i} "  j = 1
E i “U)>0
and
g i ( k , x )  := x  — 1, go(k ,x )  := 1, and g - i ( k ,  x) := k — x  .
Proof. We suppose th a t  each voter j  determ ines his preference order by first choosing 
K j  according to  the  d istribution  n m and, then , for each alternative a £ A  picks a  score 
X Î  £ { 1 , K j }  a t random . Let k : =  (k\,  fe , • • •, k n) and x : =  (x \ ,  X2 , • •• , x n), and 
for an event E  let Wk,x(E) denote the  probability  th a t  E  occurs given th a t  K \  = k\ ,
K 2 = l>2........K n = k n , and X j  = x \ ,  X =  X2 , • • • , X ” =  x n . We w rite a >¿ b or
a Rj b  if voter j  prefers a  to  6, a  <j b or a R j ^ b  if voter j  prefers b to  a, and a b or 
a Rj b  if voter j  is indifferent w ith respect to  a and b. Then we have for a,c  £ A  w ith 
a  ^  c,
x ■ — 1
Pfc,x[c >j a] = P [xj > X { \ K ,  = kj] = -J j —  , 
Pfc,x[c a] =  P [xj = \~ i \ l \ j  = kj] = y  ,
P*Æ[c <j a] = V[Xj <  X i \ K j  = kj] = .
P( n ,m ) =  to
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It follows th a t
■,jx [cMa]=  E  T ^ l c R i ^ a  and c R ^ ^ a  and . . .  and c R ^ ^ a ]
u.6{-1.0.1>"
E ¿“W)>0
_  j j  9ui(j)(kj ,Xj) _  S* (k , x
,—  , - -  kj k f  ■ -kn-£{-1,0,1}" j = 1 i n
E¿ ‘“ { i ) > o
Since the  scores are all independent given ! \ \ . I\ >. • • •, K n, we have 
P*(n,m ) =  toP[VqGj4 \{c} : cMa]
OO OO k l  k n  1  1
= to E  ' ' ' E  ^m(ki) ■ ■ ■ nm(kn) E  "  ' E  -----y Vk,x[VaeA\{c} : cilia]
k t  =  1 f c „ = l  Xl =  l  X „ = l  1 ”
_  TO y  ~  jfcro jfcro 1 y  / * 5 * ( f c , a : ) \ r o_ 1
“  ^  2 ^ + ï  "  ' 2 *»+l *!•••*„ ^  \ h - - - k n )  •m ^=1 Zi = l iTn —1 X y
In th is expression all the  factors kj  cancel, and the  result is obtained. □
5. Some particular cases
In th is section we dem onstrate the  use of the  form ulas in Theorem s 5 and 6 by 
calculating P ( n , m ) and P * ( n , m ) in certain  particu lar cases.
5.1. Single voter case
Obviously P (1, to) =  1 for all to  since a  single linear order always has a  top  element. 
As Si  (x) = x,  th is is ju s t w hat Theorem  5 ascertains:
i
to  I x m 1dx  =  x r‘
i
=  1 .
0
For a  single weak preference order the  situation  is already nontrivial: the  top  cluster 
m ay contain more th an  one alternative. (The voter hesitates as to  which alternative 
is the  best). I t is not difficult to  see, however, th a t
D» /n x m W m- 1 P  (1 ,to) =  — —-----.
Wm
Indeed, there  are to  ways to  choose a  winning alternative, and then  W m -1  ways to  
weakly order the  rem aining ones below it. As an illustration we calculate th is result
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now from Theorem 6: since S l ( k , x ) =  x — 1,
oo ,  1 v fc+l fc OO OO ,  \ k + 1
r w  = sr  E  G S >  - » " - 1 = S > -  E  ( 5
k = 1 x = l  u = 0 k = u + 1
m ^  uTO_1 mWTO_i
Wro ^  2“+1 W m '
I t is of in terest to  note th a t  P * ( l , m )  is not  decreasing in to  and th a t  the  asym ptotic 
behavior of W m is such th a t
lim P*( l , m)  = lo g 2 .
5.2. Tw o voters
Two voters w ith linear preference orders yield a  Condorcet winner iff they  pu t the 
same cadidate on top  of the ir lists. The probability  for th is  to  happen is
P(2,  to) =  — .
m
This is obtained from Theorem  5 by realizing th a t  y) =  so th a t
TO2 TO
The weak case is more com plicated th an  th is  bu t can still be greatly  simplified since 
S% (k, x)  does not depend on k  (see the  proof of Lem m a 7). For n =  2 we denote k  by 
(k , I), and x  by (x, y).
L em m a  7. For all to >  1:
P*(2,m) =  ^  ^ l ) ™ - 1 + 4  E  ( ’71 ¡  1) ( - l ) ro- ,- 1Wi2j  • (6)
Proof. To find S%(k, I; x, y) we m ust sum  over u  € {(1 , 1 ), (1 ,0), (0,1)}. So
S*2 {k , l ] x ,y )  = { x -  1 )(y -  1) +  (x -  1) +  (y -  1) =  xy  -  1 .
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We calculate:
oo oo / 1  V k+ l+ 2  k I
p í2’ra) = f í E E  m  E E ^ y ^ 1)
m  k=1 J=1  V '  x = l y=1
TO — 1
OO OO /  00 / 1 \ fc+l\ / oo / -, \ J + l
^§5— ■ (s© ) teœ
OC OC wm xr-xr-. . , ro_i 1
“ w t E B 1» - 1' 2 , . 2»
m  x = l  y = 1
oc oc m —1 /  ¡ i
_  TO y y  y  / m  -  I V  ' TO_ ; _ 1 î | '
l J K ' 2x2v
m  x = l  y = 1 ¿= 0  '  '
Îoc oc - m  —  1  oc oc /  - \  i  i sE E H r ¿  + E EE ("7
x = l  y=  1 1=1 x = l  y=  1 '  '  ,
The result follows from the fact that
OC I
E
x
—  = 2 Wi for I > 1 .Ox 1 -
□
2X 
X =  1
Let us check the formula for P*(2,m). It is easily verified that b is the winning 
alternative in 3 of the Wf = 9 ordered pairs of weak orders on {a, b}. Hence, P* (2,2) =
2 x 3/9. This concurs with (6 ). Examining the ordered pairs of weak orders on 
{cti,. . . ,  am}, it turns out that a\ appears as Condorcet winner in 29, 579, 19997 of 
these pairs for to =  3,4,5, respectively. These frequencies also result from the part 
within the brackets in (6 ). So, P*(2,3) =  3 x 29/132 = .515./ ,’ (2 . 1) =  4 x 579/75" = 
.412, P*(2,5) =  5 x 19997/5412 =  .342.
5.3. Three or m ore voters
Our approach does not permit treatment of large numbers of voters since the polyno­
mials Sn and £>* become forbiddingly complicated for large n. So, we confine ourselves 
to considering P(n, to) for n = 3 ,4 ,5 ,6 , and to =  3 , . . . ,  10. We first associate to Sn 
the functions Tj ( x i , . . .  , x n) to denote the sum of all j-th  order products of the argu­
ments of Sn, j  < n. Now, using Theorem 5 we have, for n = 3,
Sz(x,y, z) = xyz + xy( 1 — z) + xz( 1 — y) + yz( 1 — x) = xy + xz + yz — 2xyz  
=  T2(x,y, z) — 2xyz
so that i i i
P(3, to) =  to /  /  /  (T2 (x , y,z) -  2xyz)m^ 1dxdydz .
J o  J o  J o
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Since, for n = 4, a strict majority comprises 4 or 3 voters,
Si(x, y, z, t) =  xyzt + xyz(  1 — t) + xyt( 1 — z) + xzt(  1 — y) +  yzt( 1 — x) 
so that
P(4,m) = m  /  /  /  /  (T3(x,y, z ,t)  -  i x y z t ^ ^ d x d y d z d t  
J o  J o  J o  J o
We similarly obtain, omitting the arguments of the Tj for brevity,
P 1 P 1 /»l /»I /»I
P (5 ,m )  = m  j /  /  /  /  (T3 — 3T4 +  6 x y z i u ) rn^ 1dxdyd zd id u1 
J o  J o  J o  J o  J o  
p  i  /» i  /» i  /» i  /» i  /* i
P(6,m)  = rn / / / / / /  ( ^ 4  — 4 r 5 +  lO xyztuv^^dxdydzdtdudv.
J o  J o  J o  J o  J o  J o
The exact calculation of P(n, to) for n =  3 ,4 ,5 ,6 , and to up to about 20 is a matter 
of seconds for an algebraic program such as Maple. Table 2 gives the results in the 
exact form of the rational fractions resulting from these calculations as well as in real 
numbers.
Garman & Kamien [1968, p. 314] computed 1 — P(n, m)  as multinomial probabilities 
for some small and odd n and some small to. The rational fractions they report are the 
complements of the corresponding ones in Table 2. The same holds for Gillett [1977] 
who computed 1 — P(n, 3) also for some even n. The estimates of P(n, m)  that Jones 
et al [1995] obtained by simulations are confined to odd n and values of to up to 15. 
The estimates they report for n = 3,5 deviate at most 0.002 from the corresponding 
ones in Table 2. Finally, let us check by way of example two of our results for P(n  odd, 
to even) for the linear dependence on the P (n ,j)  with j  odd and < to as established 
by Gehrlein & Fishburn [1976, p. Theorem 2]. Taking the coefficients a™ from their 
Table III [o.e., 1976, p. 24], we find
17 21
P( 3,6) =  a« +  a«P(3,3) +  a¡P(  3,5) =  3 -  5 . - + 3 - -  =  — ,
P( 5 ,8 ) =  ag +  a¡P(  5,3) +  o |P (  5,5) +  a?P( 5,7)
^  „ „ 6 7  32019 , 608721061 767419 = -1 7  + 28 • —- -  14 • ____+ 4 •
72 40000 864360000 1152480 ’
which agrees with the calculated values in Table 2. Although for large n the polyno­
mials Sn and S* become more and more complicated, asymptotics of P(n,m )  and 
P*(n,m)  for large to may well be feasible. Using the above formulas for P(n,m )  it 
can be shown that P(3, to), and hence P(n, to) for all n, tends to 0 as to tends to oo, 
P(3, to) being strictly decreasing as a function of to. These results were proved before 
by May [1971] and Fishburn, Gehrlein & Maskin [1979, Theorem 1], respectively.
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T a b le  2: P(n ,m )
n 4- m  —^
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0
17 8 21 359 33569 536 13913 67079
18 9 25 450 44100 735 19845 99225
.944 .889 .840 .798 .761 .729 .701 .676
4 197 1107 1043 15359 91745 5499323 705967
9 576 4000 4500 77175 526848 35562240 5080320
.444 .342 .277 .232 .199 .174 .155 .139
67 31 32019 269513 608721061 767419 1574336347 37525387727
72 36 40000 360000 864360000 1152480 2489356800 62233920000
.931 .861 .800 .749 .704 .6 6 6 .632 .603
989 1037 472549 1078499 13057391131 1837328467 9553049400803 23921196935141
1944 2592 1440000 3888000 54454680000 8712748800 50812751001600 141146530560000
.509 .400 .328 .277 .240 .2 1 1 .188 .169
We checked the formula for P*(n ,m ) in Theorem 6  only for the case (n = 3 ,m  = 3). 
An examination of the 133 ordered triples of weak orders on {a,b,c} shows that 
486 of those triples have c as Condorcet winner. Hence, P*(3,3) =  3 x 486/133 = 
.664. This concurs with Jones et al [1995, Table 3], who report the complement. We 
programmed the formula for P*(3,3) in Fortran, putting Ö = .001 and, thus, N  = 23 
(see the Instruction in Section 3), and taking 23 as upper limit for fc¿, i = 1,2,3. The 
summations yield 485.8889 and tend to 486 in the limit for increasing upper limits 
for the fe,. So, the formula agrees with the above. However, the number of terms S* 
that were added to obtain 485.8889 was 21,024,576. Clearly, the formula is not very- 
well suited for computational purposes.
6. D iscussion
Going by independent scores we obtained an algorithm for generating random weak 
orders, and formulas for P (n ,m ) and P*(n,m). We have confined ourselves to profiles 
that satisfy the Impartial Culture (IC) condition, an assumption made in almost all 
studies on this subject. What progress is in these contributions? We evaluate this 
question with respect to the present state of the study of the development of closed­
form expressions for these probabilities.
For a fixed order of the ml possible linear orders of m  alternatives, let n = (ni , . . . ,  nm< ) 
characterize a profile with rij voters expressing the j-th  linear order of preference,
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and let p = ( p i , . . . , p m<) comprise the probabilities of a voter expressing the j- 
th linear order, j  = Listing the closed-form expressions of P ( n , m ) in
the literature, Gehrlein [1983, p. 170] finds the most tractable, essentially multino­
mial, representation of P(n,3|p) and P(n,4\p) in Gehrlein & Fishburn [1976]. Taking 
p = ( 1 / m l , 1/to!) in accord with IC, and determining the constraints on n for 
which a profile of linear orders enjoys a Condorcet winner, these latter authors ob­
tained computable expressions for P(n,  3) and P(n, 4) which they were able to eval­
uate for odd n up to 49. Gehrlein & Fishburn [1976] concentrated on P(n,m )  with 
to odd since they showed [o.e., 1976, Theorem 2] that, for all even to > 4 and n 
odd, P(n,m)  can be written as a linear combination of the P (n ,j)  with j  odd and 
less than to, and with coefficients being independent of n. In developing their ex­
pression of P(n, 4), they made use of the remark of Niemi & Weisberg [1968, p. 213] 
that P(n,m )  equals to times the probability that any particular alternative wins. 
Using this remark they also obtained an expression for P(n, 5), and noted [o.e., p. 25] 
that, more generally, expressions for P(n, 7), P(n, 9) , . . .  can similarly be obtained. 
Gehrlein & Fishburn [1979] obtained computable expressions for P(n, 7) and P(n, 9). 
These expressions are growingly complex for increasing to, and increasingly difficult 
to evaluate for larger n. In fact, Gehrlein [1983, Table 1] evaluates these formulas 
for the (odd n, odd to) pairs (< 49, 3), (< 35, 5), (< 9, 7), (< 9, 9), (< 7, 11), . . .  , 
(< 7, 17), (< 5, 19), . . . , ( <  5, 25), and uses an approximation for evaluations in the 
pairs where to or n exceeds a limit as here indicated.
In the approach taken here, these roles of n and to have in a sense been reversed. The 
expression of P(n,m)  in Theorem 5 is hardly more difficult to evaluate for larger to, 
even allows study of asymptotic behavior as to —¥ oo, but increases in complication 
quickly for larger n, to become intractable for values of n from about 11 onwards. On 
the other hand, it is valid for odd and even values of n and to alike. To the best of our 
knowledge, calculations of P(4,m) and P(6,m) [Table 2] are not in the literature.
As regards weak orders, our expression in Theorem 6  for P*(n,m) is mainly of the­
oretical interest. It is hardly computable except for the smallest values of n and to, 
and even in these cases its evaluation is more involved than a direct check of the W™ 
possible profiles for a Condorcet winner. We can only point to the small progress on 
the case n = 2 in Section 5.2.
We regard as main contributions of this essay (i) the algorithm for generating ran­
dom weak orders, and (ii) the approach by independent scores. The algorithm fa­
cilitates simulations of weak orders and, thereby, numerical estimates of P*(n,m). 
For instance, the algorithm takes less than one second for generating 1001 random 
weak orders of 6  alternatives and, thus, considerably improves the procedure of Jones 
et al. [1995] who needed quite some computer time for simulating an election with 
n = 1001 and to =  6  [o.e., 1995, footnote 10]. Also, the algorithm almost naturally 
prompts the approach by independent scores that leads to new expressions for P(n, to) 
and P*(n,m). Unfortunately, all of these developments only pertain to profiles that 
satisfy the condition of IC from which we did not escape.
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